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THE STATE ACTION CONUNDRUM'
REEXAMINED: A NEW APPROACH AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CREDITOR SELF-HELP REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Development of Constitutional Challenge to Creditor
Remedies
Since 1969 when the Supreme Court decided in Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp. 2 that a state's wage garnishment pro-
cedures were subject to the due process requirements of prior
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the general area of
creditor remedies has come under increasing constitutional
scrutiny.3 While various lower courts4 debated the applicability
of Sniadach to the remedy of statutory replevin for default
under conditional sales contracts,5 the issue was temporarily
settled by the Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin. In that
case the Florida and Pennsylvania statutory replevin proce-
dures were found constitutionally defective because they al-
lowed issuance of a writ authorizing repossession by a sheriff
pursuant to an ex parte proceeding. 7 This holding was consider-
1. This characterization reflects the sentiment expressed by Professor Black:
"Nothing. . .has at all shown why or how, or to whom, the concept (of state action)
has been in any degree 'helpful': it has been presented, true to life, as a string of
conundrums, not of solutions." Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV.
69, 92 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Black].
2. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
3. See Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1005-08 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Burke & Reber].
4. Id. at 1006 nn. 3 & 4.
5. The conditional sale contract as an independent security device has been nomi-
nally abolished under the Code. U.C.C. § 9-102(2). (All references in this article are
to the 1972 version of the Uniform Commercial Code unless otherwise indicated). The
provisions regarding purchase money security interests, U.C.C. § 9-107; relating to
automatic perfection, U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d); and priority, U.C.C. § 9-312(4), closely
parallel prior law regarding conditional sales of consumer goods. See, e.g., Uniform
Conditional Sales Act § 5 (1918). See generally J. WHIrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 754-57 (1972).
6. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The decision was by a vote of 4-3, Justices Powell and
Rehnquist not participating.
7. The Court recognized that ex parte repossession may be warranted under some
circumstances. The following were listed as examples: (1) foreclosure of a tax lien,
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); (2) national emergency, United States
U. C. C. § 9-503
ably modified in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 8 where the Louis-
iana sequestration procedure was upheld against due process
attack, notwithstanding its ex parte nature, because of the
presence of some additional safeguards of arguable signifi-
cance.' Despite its apparent dissatisfaction with the full reach
of its holding in Fuentes, the Court was nevertheless willing to
expand its condemnation of prejudgment wage garnishment in
Sniadach to cover garnishment of business bank accounts in
North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem.'
The creditor remedies discussed thus far share the charac-
teristic of direct, albeit perfunctory, involvement of the judicial
process. While, as has been seen, debtor success in challenging
these remedies has been by no means uniform, the difficulty
encountered by the debtor in such instances pales in compari-
son with the struggle encountered when challenging creditor
v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central Union
Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); (3) preventing a bank failure, Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); (4) taking misbranded drugs and impure foods off the
market, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); North Am. Stor-
age Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); and (5) to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
over a nonresident, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 90, 91 n.23, 92 nn. 24-28 (1972). See White, The Abolition of Self-Help Re-
possession; The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503, 510-11 [hereinafter cited
as White].
When the Court was squarely faced with the question of the constitutionality of ex
parte seizure to secure quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, it sidestepped the issue by announc-
ing that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction would no longer be recognized in the absence of
sufficient grounds for personal jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
This reinforces the thesis that the Court, badly split after Fuentes, will avoid address-
ing the issue of the constitutionality of creditor remedies whenever it perceives a basis
for doing so. This thesis goes a long way toward explaining the resurrection of the state
action requirement since it provides just such a basis.
8. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
9. The Louisiana sequestration procedure involved the following elements which
were not present in one or both of the Florida and Pennsylvania statutory replevin
procedures invalidated in Fuentes: (1) The sequestration order had to be signed by a
judge, rather than a mere clerk; (2) The application for the order had to contain factual
allegations upon which the creditor's claim to possession was based, rather than mere
conclusions of law; (3) The debtor could regain possession either by posting a bond or
by demonstrating at an immediately held adversary hearing that the creditor's claim
was unjustified; and (4) If the debtor regained possession by means of the adversary
hearing he would be, entitled to damages. Id. See L. TuBE, Am iuCAN CONsTrruTIONAL
LAw, 548 n.28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRaBE]. Louisiana does appear to be genu-
inely more solicitous of debtors' rights; for example, it does not recognize the right of
self-help repossession. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4562-4564, 13:3851 (West 1951)
(Louisiana has not adopted the U.C.C.). See White, supra note 7, at 516 n.46.
10. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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remedies involving the feature of self-help." It is here that the
phantom of the state-action requirement,' 2 which has thus far
proven an insurmountable obstacle, rears its ugly head. In a
case not often noted for its connection with the area of creditor
remedies, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,' 3 the Court
found that the termination of electric services by a heavily
regulated public utility because of a delinquency in the cus-
tomer's account did not constitute state action and was there-
fore not subject to fourteenth amendment due process scrutiny.
More closely relevant to the inquiry at hand, the Court in Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks" upheld the procedure for the private
foreclosure of a warehouseman's lien embodied in U.C.C. § 7-
210 against due process attack as a result of a finding of insuffi-
cient state action.
If contemporary state action doctrine were at all predicta-
ble, if it in any way provided a conceptual framework yielding
consistent results, the issue could be taken as having been
settled by Flagg. As it is, self-help repossession under U.C.C.
§ 9-503 could possibly be distinguished on at least two grounds:
(1) section 9-503 authorizes repossession by the secured party,'5
11. U.C.C. § 9-503 is a prime example. It provides in pertinent part: "[A] secured
party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession
a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without
breach of the peace. ... This in turn is a codification of the creditor's common-
law right, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 119 & n.27 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER], a point which was considered significant in Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974), the leading case dealing specifically with U.C.C. § 9-503. See Thompson,
Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application
to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1, 49-53 [hereinafter cited as Thomp-
son].
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in pertinent part as follows: "No State shall
• . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis
added). The limitation of the reach of the amendment to state action was first enunci-
ated in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
14. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
15. Repossession is peculiarly a police function. Normally, when a secured creditor
wishes to repossess the collateral upon the debtor's default, he does not do so himself,
but hires a private repossessor. See White, supra note 7, at 521. The private repossessor
is in turn licensed by the state and is required to give the police notice of the reposses-
sion. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 57. This closely parallels the situation presented
by Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), where state action was found in the
coercive conduct of an investigation by a private detective who was in effect deputized
by the police. But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 n.14 (1978). Justice
[Vol. 62:414
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whereas section 7-210 only authorizes the warehouseman to sell
property already within his possessson;I6 (2) the warehouseman
in Flagg did not seek a deficiency judgment 7 so the question
of the constitutionality of the judicial enforcement 8 of self-help
remedies has not as yet been presented to the Court. One can
only bemoan the condition of a constitutional doctrine which
requires the drawing of such insubstantial distinctions, but
such is the condition of contemporary state action doctrine and
that is the subject of the next section of this comment.
B. The Development of State Action Doctrine
The purpose of this section is not to present an exhaustive
litany of the Court's work in the state action area; that has
been ably done by others. 9 The intention is rather to examine,
out of the many categories of state action cases,'" the two
"heads of a hydra"' 2' which were directly involved in deciding
the Flagg case, the authorization and encouragement cases,22
and the public function cases.2 This will be done with a view
toward pointing out the inconsistencies and -the total lack of
doctrinal guidance which characterize contemporary state ac-
tion doctrine in these areas.
Rehnquist's suggestion there that "this Court has never considered the private exercise
of traditional police functions" is clearly wrong in light of Williams. Id.
16. A warehouseman's lien, enforced pursuant to U.C.C. § 7-210, is limited to
"goods covered by a warehouse receipt or on the proceeds thereof in his possession
. . . ." U.C.C. § 7-209(1) (emphasis added).
17. Although he clearly could have under U.C.C. § 7-210(7), which preserves to a
warehouseman all rights which a creditor has against his debtor.
18. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court clearly distinguished be-
tween voluntary compliance with a racially discriminatory restrictive covenant, which
would be constitutionally innocuous, and the judicial enforcement thereof, which
would be impermissible state action. Thus it could be argued that a private disposition
pursuant to U.C.C. § 7-210 is free from constitutional scrutiny only so long as the
courts are not involved. When court ratification of the private conduct is sought in an
action for a deficiency judgment, the Shelley situation is presented.
19. See, e.g., Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1041-1109.
20. The categories developed by Burke & Reber include the following: (1) direct
action initiated and carried out by a state officer or agent; (2) concerted action by the
state and a private party; (3) private parties performing a "public function"; (4)
private action compelled by the state; (5) action by a private party regulated by the
state; (6) private action authorized or encouraged by state law. Id. This section will
deal with categories (3) and (6).
21. Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. Rxv. 3, 5 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Van Alstyne & Karst].
22. 436 U.S. at 164-66.
23. Id. at 157-64.
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1. The Authorization and Encouragement Cases
The Court has been repeatedly presented with the situation
where private conduct has been challenged on constitutional
grounds because of some level of approval lent to such conduct
by either the state or federal government.24 The level of ap-
proval necessary to trigger constitutional scrutiny has been dif-
ficult to identify, and different results have been reached on
strikingly similar facts.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,2 for example, the
Court found the necessary level of approval in the dismissal of
an investigation of the challenged conduct. The municipal
transport company for the District of Columbia contracted
with a local radio station for the broadcast of radio programs
on its streetcars. This was challenged on first amendment
grounds based upon a monopolization of speech on the street-
cars, and on fifth amendment due process grounds based upon
an invasion of the riders' privacy. The transport company was
heavily regulated by Congress through the Public Utilities
Commission and constituted a virtual monopoly of public
transportation. In finding governmental action, 26 the Court
specifically relied upon the fact that an investigation was or-
dered which was dismissed after a formal hearing. 27 The consti-
tutional challenges were, however, rejected on the merits.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority28 presented a dif-
ferent level of state involvement which was nevertheless found
insufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment. The operator
of a restaurant and a parking lot on land leased from the state
practiced racial discrimination in serving customers. This ac-
tion was attributed to the State of Delaware, either on the
theory that a Delaware statute authorized the racial discrimi-
nation, 9 or on the theory that the state was in a position to
prevent the discrimination.3 0 That either ground is problematic
was eloquently pointed out by Justice Harlan in dissent .3
24. The state action requirement, insofar as it is applicable to state governments,
is equally applicable to the federal government. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1147 n.1.
25. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
26. Id. at 462.
27. Id.
28. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
29. Id. at 726-27.
30. Id. at 725.
31. Id. at 728-30.
[Vol. 62:414
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Griffin v. Maryland12 found impermissible the enforcement
by a sheriff of a private policy of racial discrimination formu-
lated by an owner of a public amusement park. This was the
one case in a series of sit-in cases which the Court was forced
to decide on constitutional grounds.3 The Court noted that the
policy of discrimination originated in a private decision but
apparently considered the state action line to have been passed
when the private actor asked for police assistance in enforcing
his decision regarding the use of his property.
Reitman v. Mulkey34 was concerned with California's Prop-
osition 14 which became article I, section 26 of the California
Constitution. That referendum effectively repealed existing
fair housing legislation3 and constitutionalized the right to dis-
criminate in the provision of housing." In a series of plurality
opinions, the consensus was that the state's approval of racial
discrimination had reached the level of constitutional viola-
tion.
Evans v. Newton 7 dealt with a testamentary trust esta-
bished in 1911 by Senator Bacon's will to maintain a public
park for the use of whites only. The enforcement of the terms
of the trust by the Georgia Supreme Court together with the
participation by the municipality in the upkeep of the park
were found to constitute impermissible state action. It is not
clear whether it was the function of running a public park in a
discriminatory manner which disturbed the Court, or whether
it was the Georgia court's approval of the terms of a discrimina-
tory trust which triggered the scrutiny. It is clear, though, that
the decision to discriminate arose independently in the mind
of Senator Bacon.
Thus far we have a wide panoply of circumstances in which
the government was found to have crossed the bounds of per-
32. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
33. See Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1030-32.
34. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
35. See Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1074 n.268.
36. Propositon 14 provided in pertinent part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
Id. at 1074.
37. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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missible neutrality. We have (1) failure to proscribe an activity
as a result of an investigation; (2) failure to police the choice
of customers served by a lessee; (3) assistance to the owner of
private property in excluding those whose presence is not
wanted; (4) granting of a right heretofore not recognized; and
(5) failure to overturn the provisions of a will. The next round
of cases should cast considerable doubt on the continued via-
bility of finding state action in any of these circumstances.
Moose Lodge v. Irvis" found no state action in the granting
of a liquor license to a private club which practiced racial dis-
crimination. In this instance the activity of selling liquor was
heavily regulated by the state, and the grant of a license pre-
supposed an examination and approval of the practices of the
licensee. Yet, as the Court pointed out in a footnote,39 so long
as the state had not undertaken a formal investigation of the
activity in question, it had not impermissibly approved it. The
Court did find state action in an administrative regulation
which mandated that each licensee adhere to its constitution
and bylaws, which in the case of Moose Lodge required dis-
crimination. Even this holding was probably eroded in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 4 There the Court held that the
unilateral termination of electrical services by a public utility
did not constitute state action despite the fact that the termi-
nation practice was contained in a tariff which was required to
be submitted to the Public Utilities Commission of the state
for approval, and the fact that the utility was affirmatively
required to abide by its tariff. The Court rejected the argument
that such approval constituted state action by observing that
"[lthis provision (for termination) has appeared in Metropoli-
tan's previously filed tariffs for many years and has never been
the subject of a hearing or other scrutiny by the Commission." 4'
These developments suggest, first of all, that if Public Utili-
ties Commission v. Pollak42 has not been effectively overruled
there must be some distinction of constitutional dimensions
between approving a practice after holding a formal hearing
and approving the same practice without holding such a hear-
38. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
39. Id. at 175 n.3.
40. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
41. Id. at 354.
42. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
[Vol. 62:414
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ing. Similarly, if Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 3 is
still viable, there must be a constitutional distinction between
lessees and licensees. Such propositions may make fine minor
premises in a legal syllogism, but it is the search for the major
premise that provides the frustration.
If Griffin v. Maryland" stands for the proposition that the
decision as to the use to which private property will be put
comes under constitutional scrutiny whenever the police are
asked to enforce it, it cannot survive the Court's decisions in
Lloyd Corp., Inc. v. Tanner45 and Hudgens v. NLRB.45 Since
those decisions will be considered in the next section it is
enough for now to observe that the decisions taken together
hold that the owner of a shopping center can enforce the crimi-
nal trespass laws to exclude those engaging in speech to which
he objects and that he can require enforcement assistance from
the state without being affected by the first amendment.
Reitman v. Mulkey47 is facially inconsistent with James v.
Valtierra5 at least from a state action standpoint. Valtierra
involved article XXXIV of the California Constitution which
required majority approval at a community election before low-
income housing could be built in that community. It thus con-
stitutionalized the right to discriminate against the poor in the
way that article I, section 26 constitutionalized the right to
discriminate on the basis of race. The asserted distinction be-
tween the two cases is based upon a holding that wealth is not
a suspect classification. Yet, if the Reitman premise is ac-
cepted, the granting of the right to discriminate against the
poor involves the state directly in that discrimination. It is
clear from a number of cases49 that the state can no more arbi-
trarily discriminate against the poor than it can arbitrarily
discriminate against anyone. This proposition does not require
a holding that wealth is a suspect classification. Valtierra,
then, must be bottomed upon a holding that the state, by
43. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
44. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
45. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
46. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
47. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
48. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
49. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (right to interstate travel); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to criminal justice system).
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enacting article XXXIV, is not directly involved in the decision
of the members of a community to exclude low-income hous-
ing. As such, it undercuts the premise upon which Reitman was
based, namely, that by constitutionalizing the right to discrim-
inate the state directly participates in the resulting discrimina-
tion.
Evans v. Newton 0 was followed on its heels by Evans v.
Abney. 51 The same provision in Senator Bacon's 1911 will was
before the Court again, but this time the Georgia Supreme
Court had applied the cy pres doctrine" to the charitable trust
in order to terminate it. The Georgia Court concluded, quite
correctly in all probability, that Senator Bacon would rather
have no park at all than one open to blacks, effectively closing
the park to both races. The same question was presented to the
Court as had been presented in the Newton case, namely,
whether the Georgia Court's authorization of Senator Bacon's
posthumous discriminatory activity constituted impermissible
state action. Inexplicably, this time the Court answered no. To
be sure, the closing of the park affected both races and this
factor would later be considered significant in Palmer v.
Thompson53 where the Court sustained a municipal closing of
public swimming pools which had previously been ordered in-
tegrated. But the Court based its decision in Palmer on a re-
fusal to inquire into the motives of the municipality for under-
taking a facially neutral act. The closing of the park in Abney
was not even facially neutral, as it came about only as a result
of giving effect to Senator Bacon's discriminatory purpose. If
the holding in Newton were followed, this would be the equiva-
lent of the state's acting for an avowedly discriminatory pur-
pose, which would clearly be a violation of the constitution.
Thus, the authorization and encouragement cases in the
state action area are a road leading nowhere. Whether the pub-
lic function cases provide any more guidance is a question to
be taken up in the next section.
2. The Public Function Cases
The central inquiry in this area is whether a private party
50. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
51. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
52. See G.G. BOcm, r & G.T. BOGmT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, 525-31 (5th
ed. 1973).
53. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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is performing a function so closely associated with the state
that he should be held to the same standards in performing it
as the state. This area is characterized by a considerable degree
of vacillation, so that lines drawn in one case are subject to
express obliteration in the next.
Even with respect to the political process, an area which
would appear to be about as public as any, the Court had some
initial difficulty in drawing the line between state action and
private action. The earliest cases involved a white primary
election of one sort or another. Nixon v. Herndon" arose when
a black was denied the right to vote in the Democratic primary
by the express terms of a Texas statute. The Court had no
trouble finding a violation of the fifteenth amendment. The
state attempted to circumvent that holding by delegating to
the executive committee of the Democratic Party the power to
prescribe voter qualifications. In Nixon v. Condon55 the same
plaintiff challenged the practice and impelled the Court to
render the ruse ineffective.
The march toward expanding the public function category
was temporarily halted, though, when Texas repealed its stat-
utes controlling party voter qualifications, leaving the matter
to be decided by the party. In Grovey v. Townsend"5 the denial
of the right of a black to vote under this system was found not
to violate the fifteenth amendment. The state was held to be
insufficiently involved for the state action requirement to be
satisfied.5
In Smith v. Alwright,5" however, the Court began to look
not at the degree of state involvement but at the nature of the
function being performed. In holding that the right to vote in
the Texas Democratic primary was secured by the fifteenth
amendment regardless of who attempted to deny it, the Court
expressly overruled Grovey. After emphasizing the role played
by the Democratic primary in Texas politics, 9 the Court con-
cluded that because of this role it was a state function that was
being performed.'" This holding was extended in Terry v.
54. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
55. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
56. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
57. Id: at 55.
58. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
59. Id. at 664-65.
60. Id. at 660.
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Adams' to cover the right to vote in a preprimary election run
by a county political organization which dominated county pol-
itics.612 Although the organization was a private one, its control
over county politics made the holding of its elections a public
function.
It thus appears that, despite some early hesitancy, the
Court has been willing to commit itself to the notion that elec-
tions are a public function and must be run in accordance with
the Constitution no matter who is running them.63 It is in other
areas that the search for doctrinal guidance leaves one empty-
handed. The first amendment cases provide an excellent exam-
ple.
In Marsh v. Alabama 4 a company town owner enforced the
state trespass laws against a Jehovah's Witness who persisted
in distributing religious literature on the town's streets. In re-
versing the trespass conviction, the Court held that the reli-
gious liberty and free speech rights of the pamphleteer were
secure against interference by the town's owner. The Court
emphasized the functional equivalence of the town to a munici-
pality despite its private ownership.65 In rather broad language
the Court seemed to give a great deal of content to its public
equivalence holding: "The more an owner for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and con-
stitutional rights of those who use it."66 This language was
relied upon in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.,6" for a holding that labor picketing of a store within
a shopping center was protected by the first amendment from
interference by the shopping center owner. The functional
equivalence of the shopping center to the business district in
Marsh was stressed. Up to this point, shopping centers, with
their virtually unlimited clientele and their wide open spaces
were within the public domain regardless of who owned them.
But this expansive notion did not long survive. It was first
61. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
62. Id. at 463.
63. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).
64. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
65. Id. at 502-03.
66. Id. at 506.
67. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
68. Id. at 318.
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cut back in Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner" where antiwar demon-
strators were successfully required to conduct their activity off
a shopping center premises. The Court made the distinction
between first amendment activity which was related to the use
to which the property was put and such activity not so re-
lated,70 as if that had any bearing on either the nature of first
amendment rights or the public nature of the property. In that
case, Justice Marshall wrote a prophetic dissenting opinion in
which he declared that Logan Valley could not survive
Tanner.7' His prophecy was fulfilled in Hudgens v. NLRB 2 in
which the Court, in another labor picketing context, expressly
overruled Logan Valley. Justice Marshall had also indicated
that Marsh was on shaky ground but the Court has not as yet
taken the step of overruling it.
In its latest pronouncement on the state action issue, Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 73 the Court addressed the public function
question with Delphic clarity. It previously had noted that ex-
clusivity is required for a function to be public, 74 but did not
bother to explain why the electric utility in Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 75 which was the functionally exclusive
purveyor of electricity in Pennsylvania, was not performing a
public function. And in virtually the same breath that it listed
"such functions as education, fire and police protection, and
tax collection" 7 as candidates for the public function appella-
tion, the Court declined to decide the question one way or the
other.77 Judicial pronouncements such as this reach "the van-
ishing point where law does not exist, and must be brought into
being, if at all, by an act of free creation.
78
This cursory review has attempted to demonstrate that
state action doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court "is a
map whose every country is marked incognito. '7 Whether
69. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
70. Id. at 562, 564. See also 391 U.S. at 320 n.9.
71. 407 U.S. at 571.
72. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
73. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
74. Id. at 159.
75. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
76. 436 U.S. at 163.
77. Id. at 163-64.
78. B. CAYtozo, TME GRowTH OF THE LAW, 44 (1924).
79. Black, supra note 1, at 95.
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more insight has been forthcoming from the scholarly com-
munity is a subject that remains next to be explored.
C. The Various Academic Theories of State Action
Although much has been written on the state action ques-
tion,o the approaches can be easily categorized. Allowance
must be made for differences in nuance, but, taking this into
account, the debate has divided scholars into essentially two
camps. First, there are those who take the view that there is
something worth preserving in the state action requirement.
This view has been denominated the traditionalist theory.8
Second, there are those who would do away with the state
action requirement entirely. This has been denominated the
revisionist theory.2
1. The Traditionalist Theory
Traditionalist theory holds that the state action require-
ment, aside from its hoary origin in one of the first cases to
construe the fourteenth amendment, 83 reflects values that are
worth preserving in a modem context. Its function, broadly
speaking, is to preserve a realm of private conduct within
which the fourteenth amendment does not operate. It may
seem strange indeed that we would wish to limit the operation
of what has been called "the greatest law on earth. ' 84 But, at
least according to two of the leading proponents of this theory,
"This limitation is an express recognition of the role of the
Constitution .... 1)85
The Constitution is seen, at least in its self-executing provi-
sions,86 as a charter of limitations upon "the arbitrary and ca-
pricious exercise of. . .governmental power .... ",87 Whereas
originally such limitations were only thought necessary as
against the federal government, 8 the Civil War and the ten-
sions which caused it demonstrated the necessity of curbing the
80. For a chronological review of the state action literature, see Thompson, supra
note 11, at 10-13.
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. See also Black, supra note 1, at 84.
83. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
84. T!RM, supra note 9, at 158.
85. Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1011.
86. See Tawsa, supra note 9, at 1147 n.1.
87. Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1013.
88. The Bill of Rights was originally held inapplicable to the states. Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 3 U.S. 464, 7 Pet. 243 (1833).
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state governments as well. But it is only the leviathan of gov-
ernment which is seen as requiring such tight restraints. Ac-
cording to this view, the allocation of power between private
individuals and their governments was not changed by the
fourteenth amendment.
The state action requirement is also seen as insuring that
the fourteenth amendment does not radically disrupt the bal-
ance of power between the federal and state governments.,, The
fourteenth amendment, it is asserted, was not intended to dis-
place the states as the chief architects of private relationships.
The federal government remains a government of enumerated
powers ready to step in only when weighty national interests
are at stake. To construe the fourteenth amendment as grant-
ing a roving commission to the federal government to interfere
with private decisions is seen as inconsistent with the values
of federalism.'" The federal government must be limited as
much as possible in its direct operation upon private individu-
als; if it acts at all, it can only act against states.,,
At the same time, the state action limitation is seen as
preserving a maximum of freedom to private individuals in the
structuring of their relationships.92 The states, unconstrained
by such a limitation, are nevertheless trusted to interfere as
little as possible with private decisionmaking. The federal gov-
ernment, on the other hand, is viewed with suspicion, as if
every grant of power to it will make inroads into individual
liberty. According to this argument an inverse relationship ex-
ists between federal power and private freedom. The state ac-
tion limitation thus maximizes private freedom by minimizing
federal power.
Other arguments adduced include the separation of powers
argument 3 and the floodgates of litigation argument. The
separation of powers argument asserts, without explaining
why, that Congress is more suited to act under the fourteenth
89. See Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1014-16. See also Van Alstyne & Karst,
supra note 21, at 8.
90. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
91. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). For an example of how the federal
government is constrained as well in its operation directly upon the states, see National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
92. Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1016-17.
93. Id. at 1017.
94. Thompson, supra note 11, at 29.
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amendment mandate than is the Court. The floodgates of liti-
gation argument however, is clearly an afterthought and should
not be taken seriously.
It is notable that even the traditionalists are incapable of
formulating a consistent state action theory. They content
themselves with a description, necessarily lengthy and confus-
ing,97 of what the Supreme Court has done, and with prognosti-
cations as to the likely course of its future meanderings.
Whether this is the best that can be done remains to be seen.
2. The Revisionist Theory
This approach takes due cognizance of the fact that the
search for state action "has the flavor of a torchless search for
a way out of a damp echoing cave. 918 The search is doomed to
failure because what is being sought is really omnipresent.
"State action is everywhere. This has always been the case, and
becomes increasingly so as society grows more complex." 9 This
undeniable verity is recognized even by the traditionalists:
"State law in all of its forms thus has an enormous impact upon
almost every form of private activities."'' 0 One is regulated by
law when one travels to and from work,' when one is born,'"'
and when one dies, 03 when one marries, 04 when one is di-
vorced,' "5 when one works,00 plays,0 7 eats,08 drinks, 09 plans his
95. The argument is made in Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the
Public-Private Penumbra, 12 TEx. L.Q. 1, 17-18 (1969). Judge Friendly himself is not
convinced by the argument, for he is an advocate of the revisionist theory. This is as
it should be. The floodgates of litigation argument, which has been interposed as a
barrier in contexts as diverse as the abolition of interspousal immunity, see PROSSER,
supra note 11, at 863 & n.46, and the imposition of liability for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, see PROSSER, supra note 11, at 328 & n.36, appears to be no more
than a last ditch effort to resist inevitable changes in the law. The argument has no
substantive force whatsoever. It would be as logical to advocate that courts be closer
on alternate Wednesdays and Fridays.
96. See Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1041.
97. A review of the state action cases comprises some two-thirds of the Burke &
Reber article. See Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1041-1114.
98. Black, supra note 1, at 95.
99. Thompson, supra note 11, at 22.
100. Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1105.
101. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 346 (1977).
102. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 69.32, 146.01, 632.01 (1977).
103. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. chs. 156-57 (1977).
104. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 245 (1977).
105. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 247 (1977).
106. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 103 (1977).
107. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 163 (1977).
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investments, 110 trains for a livelihood"' and cares for his
health."2 The law even regulates how one will be entertained
in his home, 3 3and invades the private precincts of the conjugal
bed."4 Against this background, it is almost laughable to even
try and distinguish between state and private action.
Moreover, the state action requirement has been recognized
as the last refuge of racists."5 It all has the air of subterfuge
about it, as the practice of racial discrimination is placed more
and more into private hands only to have the Supreme Court
catch up with the trick and frustrate the ruse. State action is
a game of "hide the discrimination" which the racists were
losing. Of course, the racists, it is true, have won a few rounds
as of late,"6 but this may be explicable on other grounds than
the cynical one that it is a new Supreme Court that is sitting."7
And that premise certainly does nothing to reduce the sense of
futility surrounding the search for a theory of state action.
The revisionists ask only for candor from the Court."' Since,
they assert, it cannot be seriously contended that significant
state involvement is misging in any case, decisions ostensibly
bottomed on a finding of no state action must in reality reflect
the presence of other values."' It would be far better for the
Court to forthrightly state what those other values are than for
it to hide behind the cloak of the state action doctrine.2 0
D. The Elusive Purposes Behind a State Action Requirement
The revisionist theory recognizes the importance of the val-
ues supposedly served by the state action requirement. They
argue, however, that those values would be more adequately
108. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 97 (1977).
109. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 196 (1977).
110. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 71 (1977).
111. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. chs. 115-21 (1977).
112. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. chs. 140-49 (1977).
113. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § § 944.15-17 (1977). But see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
115. See Black, supra note 1, at 84-91.
116. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970).
117. It may reflect increasing deference to congressional responsibility under the
Civil War amendments. See Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1018-20.
118. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 21, at 58.
119. Id. at 7.
120. Thompson, supra note 11, at 29.
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served if they were expressly recognized and dealt with in Court
opinions rather than smothered beneath the surface of a for-
malistic inquiry into state-individual contacts which are inev-
itably present.
For example, the protection of individuals from arbitrary
governmental power is certainly not inconsistent with the pro-
tection of individuals from the arbitrary exercise of heavily
concentrated private power. This is seen as the true issue pre-
sented by a case such as Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., ,21
an issue which was resolved by default by the invocation of the
state action requirement. 22
Nor is the value inherent in the private structuring of rela-
tionships really served by the state action doctrine. 2 3 Private
relationships are already structured against a pervasive back-
drop of law. What harm could possibly come from injecting the
constitution into that backdrop? And, conjuring the spectre of
federalism does nothing to answer the question of why, if the
federal government can act directly upon the states, it cannot
act upon the states in their relations with private individuals.'2 4
But perhaps the most telling criticism of this "dialectic of
purpose"' ' comes from Professor Tribe. After reviewing the
concerns with the private structuring of relationships and fed-
eralism he observes: "Plainly, these purposes coexist only in
tension. It is not possible to preserve maximum space simulta-
neously for individual choice and for state or congressional reg-
ulation: to the extent the states or Congress act, the space left
to individual discretion is narrowed."' 21 One might add that the
same is ineluctibly true to the extent the states or Congress do
not act. But the answer is not simply to expand "the space left
to individual discretion." Even if that were done, hard choices
would still have to be made. Understanding the nature of those
choices, it is submitted, is the key to resolving the state action
conundrum.
E. A Glimpse of What is Demanded of the Court
The term "interest" is defined in the Restatement of Torts
121. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
122. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 23.
123. Id. at 25-27.
124. Id. at 24.25.
125. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1149.
126. Id. at 1150.
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(Second) as "the object of any human desire."' Interests fall
broadly into two categories: those which are "legally pro-
tected,"' ' and those which are not. The decision as to which
interests to clothe with legal protection is perhaps the most
fundamental one for law to make. In an ideal world where
interests never come in conflict there would be nothing for the
law to protect, for the fulfillment of any interest would never
require the sacrifice of any other. But we do not live in such a
world. Interests come into conflict all the time and when the
resulting dispute is pressed before a society's legal institutions
the decision must be made as to which interests to sacrifice and
which to protect.
It is in the nature of our constitutional system that only
private individuals have interests deserving of legal protection.
A government has no such interests 9 and can only legitimately
assert the interests of those whom it represents. 3 Oftentimes
the bona fides of a government in asserting those interests can
be questioned. In those instances it is the province of the law
to ferret out the legitimate public interests from those which
are merely a cover for the interest of those in power in the
expansion and perpetuation of that power.
This discussion should highlight the distinction between
two types of disputes which are routinely pressed before a court
of law for resolution. The distinction is not between cases in
which a government is a party and those in which it is not. 3'
The distinction, rather, is between cases in which private inter-
ests are directly in conflict and those in which the conflict of
private interests is more attenuated. An illustration may be of
some help.
Consider a simple neighborly dispute between Tenant A in
an apartment building who has a penchant for playing the
phonograph at full blast and Tenant B across the hall in the
same apartment building lying in bed nursing a headache.
Tenant A has an interest in listening to very loud music while
Tenant B has an interest in peace and quiet. Which of the two
the law will protect may depend on various circumstances; that
127. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 1 (1965).
128. Id., Comment d.
129. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 21, at 7.
130. Id. at 8.
131. See TaME, supra note 9, at 1124 n.7.
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the two interests are in direct conflict seems plain enough.
Consider now the same Tenant A engaging in amorous ac-
tivities without benefit of marriage with another individual in
the bedroom of Tenant A's apartment. Tenant B learns of this
and seeks to have their state's laws prohibiting such behavior
enforced against Tenant A. A criminal prosecution is initiated
against Tenant A. Tenant A has an interest in engaging in such
activity. The state, however, as has been observed, has no legit-
imate interest of its own and is merely asserting the interest of
people such as Tenant B in not having such activity take place.
Whether the state is genuinely asserting that interest or is
rather asserting its own interest in controlling the type of peo-
ple who would engage in such activity is a question properly to
be considered.
That it is not the party structure before the court which
raises this question can be seen by varying the facts slightly.
Assume that the state has enacted a law which provides that
any person learning of the immoral activity of another may
bring a civil action against that other and, upon establishing
the immoral activity before the court, is entitled to recover
personally from that other a $10,000 fine. Tenant B brings such
an action. It is clear that the interests asserted have not
changed; the only change is in the parties asserting them. Ten-
ant B is still not asserting an interest which is only his as much
as it is the interest of all people such as Tenant B.132 Thus, if
"Tenant B" is substituted for "state" in the question posed
following the preceding hypothetical, that question is still pro-
perly to be considered.
The point of all this is that both in the type of case where
private interests are directly in conflict and in the type of case
where the conflict of private interests is more attenuated, the
state clearly acts by deciding which interest to protect. How'
ever, by doing away entirely with the state action requirement
in any form, both types of cases would have to be decided in
the same way. In the case of a direct conflict between private
132. Thus the hypothetical presented should not be confused with class action
suits, where the interests of each member of the class are severable. This is clearly true
with respect to "spurious" class actions which are in reality no more than individual
causes of action asserted simultaneously. It is no less true of "true" class actions, where
the cause of action is held jointly by all the members of the class, because to the extent
that the joint tenancy can be severed, the cause of action, and therefore the underlying
interests, are severable. See generally Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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interests, to the extent that any or all of those interests could
claim constitutional sanction, the conflict would have to be
resolved by a court, and ultimately by the Supreme Court, by
a process of constitutional adjudication. Whether that is neces-
sarily desirable remains to be explored.
HI. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING A STATE ACTION
THEORY
It is worth noting at the outset that the question of the
value of a state action requirement, under the approach sug-
gested, is the question of the value of separate treatment for the
first of the types of cases dealt with in the preceding section,
namely, those in which private interests are directly in conflict.
The other type of cases, those in which the conflict of private
interests is more attenuated, is distinguishable because cases
of that type present the question of the bona fides of the inter-
ests asserted by one side. The level of scrutiny applied to the
assertion of those interests is a central question of constitu-
tional law and will not be dealt with here at any great length.
It follows though that whatever level of scrutiny is applied to
cases of the second type it is always proper.
It is also to be observed that when private interests are
directly in conflict, the fact that one or more of those interests
is sanctioned by the constitution does not require that those
interests always supersede. The interests must still be weighed
and balanced before the decision is made as to which to pro-
tect. For example, it is certainly true that one can be prose-
cuted for the crime of murder if one verbally-orders the killing
of another human being despite the fact that free speech is
unqualifiedly protected by the constitution'3 while life is only
protected against denial without due process of law. 34 Since in
the type of cases under consideration the central task is to
balance the interests in direct conflict, the question becomes
who is to do the balancing.
A. The Origin of the State Action Requirement
The fons et origo31 of the state action requirement is in the
opinion of Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases. 1 3 The
133. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
134. Id. at amends. V; XIV, § 1.
135. Black, supra note 1, at 84.
136. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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cases presented the question of whether Congress had the
power under the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation
guaranteeing the right to the enjoyment of public accommoda-
tions regardless of race. That the answer was a resounding no
is well known. It is instructive, however, to examine some of the
assumptions made by Justice Bradley in answering the ques-
tion in that way. He stated:
An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference
whatever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States. It is not
predicated on any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare
that certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed
offenses, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceed-
ings in the courts of the United States. It does not profess to
be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the
States; it does not make its operation to depend upon any
such wrong committed. It applies equally to cases arising in
States which have the justest laws respecting the personal
rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to
enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may
have violated the prohibition of the amendment . . . . ,
Justice Bradley was expressing his faith in the institutions of
state governments to adequately protect the interests of all of
its citizens.'1 It was at least in part because of this faith that
he felt that Congress had overstepped its bounds.
A number of inferences can thus be drawn from the above
quoted language. First and most obviously, if congressional
lack of power under the fourteenth amendment is predicated
upon the assumption that the states will live up to their consti-
tutional duties, then to the extent that the states neglect those
duties congressional power is expanded.' 9 That is precisely
what happened during the 1960's when the Court removed
many, if not all, restrictions on congressional power under sec-
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The zenith of this expan-
sion was reached in United States v. Guest ° where six justices
of the Court expressed the opinion that Congress could reach
private conduct regardless of state involvement. Congressional
power under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment was simi-
137. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
138. See Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 21, at 5.
139. See generally Burke & Reber, supra note 3, at 1018-32.
140. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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larly expansively construed in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. '
where 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was held to reach private racial dis-
crimination in the sale of housing.
The second inference to be drawn from Justice Bradley's
language is that the states have an affirmative duty under the
fourteenth amendment to prevent the invasions of "the per-
sonal rights of citizens" on the grounds of race. It is only when
they have "the justest laws" that they discharge this duty.
From such a perspective the Court's decision in Reitman v.
Mulkey4 2 seems almost compelled by the Civil Rights Cases. "3
The third inference to be drawn is perhaps the most subtle.
It is that the Court must interpret the Constitution with a view
toward how well the states are functioning with regard to
"respecting the rights of citizens." If a state has "the justest
laws" it is not the business of the Court to intervene. Of course
it can always be argued that the Court is the final arbiter of
the justness of a state's laws.' That this is not always the case
remains to be demonstrated.
B. The Proper Function of Judicial Review
It is not the intention here to join the debate as to the
legitimacy of judicial review in general.' Judicial review has
been with us since Marbury v. Madison'4' and there is no sign
that it is about to go away. Moreover, judicial review is categor-
ically proper in the type of case where the conflict of private
interests is attenuated. As has been seen, 7 cases of that type
are characterized by the fact that the bona fides of the repre-
sentative assertion of generalized interests can be called into
question. The possibility exists in those cases that the real
interest being asserted is that of those in power in the expan-
sion and perpetuation of that power. To the extent that there
is a possibility that such an interest is being asserted by other
institutions of government, "[ilt is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department"'4 8 to apply the Constitu-
141. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
142. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
143. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
144. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 295-96 (1920).
145. See generally R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
146. 5 U.S. 368, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
147. See text accompanying notes 129-32 supra.
148. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 368, 389, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
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tion so as to hold those other institutions in line. For if the
Court will not do so, who will? Unchecked power is despotic
power, and someone must provide the check.
The question this article addresses is whether the function
of judicial review is more limited in the type of cases where
private interests are directly in conflict. The answer to this
question, it is submitted, can be found in Justice Stone's fa-
mous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.' 49
That footnote reads in pertinent part:
There may be narrower scope for operaton of the presump-
tion of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four-
teenth ....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation ....
Nor need we enquire whether . . . prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.' 0
This footnote is usually cited for the proposition that judi-
cial scrutiny is at its highest level when rights guaranteed by
the first ten amendments or suspect classifications are in-
volved.' 5' But this statement can be seen to stand for a more
general proposition, namely that it is the sole function of judi-
cial review to insure that the "political processes" designed by
the framers serve to adequately reflect the will of the people.
It is clear that when "discrete and insular minorities" are de-
nied participation within these "political processes" those pro-
cesses are incapable of adequately reflecting the will of the
people, but reflect instead only the will of those fortunate
enough not to be excluded. Full participation in this context
149. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
150. Id. at 152 n.4.
151. See generally TRIBE, supra note 9, at 572-75.
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means more than merely voting and running for office. It in-
cludes engaging in every aspect of social intercourse which is
influenced by, and in turn influences, the outcome of those
processes. A truly representative democracy requires no less.
And it is equally clear that the protection afforded the
rights guaranteed by the first ten amendments serves the same
function. The Bill of Rights is not a catalogue of every human
interest worthy of protection. As has been pointed out' the
right to life itself is not unconditionally guaranteed. The rights
singled out for protection are those, and only those, necessary
for the proper functioning of the political processes in the wid-
est sense outlined above. Freedom of speech and of the press
are protected to insure intelligent self-governance. 53 Freedom
of religion and the prohibition against an establishment of reli-
gion exist to insure that the political arena is free from the
corruption of religious sectarianism. '54 The protections afforded
a criminally accused insure that the criminal justice apparatus
not be abused for the suppression of political dissidents.
Enough has been said, it is believed, to make the point.
The Court, then, is charged with the duty of making certain
that the political machinery set up by the Constitution remains
well-oiled. Once that is done, the Court must content itself
with watching the machine work.
C. Limitations on Judicial Review
If "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judi-
cial department to say what the law is,""' it is equally emphat-
ically the province and duty of the legislative department to
make the laws. As has been noted above, 5 ' a fundamental
function of law is to decide which private interests to protect
when private interests come in conflict. This is a peculiarly
legislative function at least for reasons of institutional capac-
ity, legitimacy and flexibility.
1. Institutional Capacity 51
Any court, including the Supreme Court, acts in cases and
152. See text accompanying notes 133 & 134 supra.
153. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT
(1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1965).
154. IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 487 (G. Hung, ed. 1910).
155. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 368, 389 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
156. See text accompanying notes 127 & 128 supra.
157. See generally Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Func-
tional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
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controversies presented before it on the basis of a limited fac-
tual setting. It has no independent investigative apparatus. It
cannot hold hearings or call witnesses except insofar as neces-
sary to resolve the single controversy before it. The information
which is made available to the court is presented in an adver-
sarial context which may be productive of the truth as between
the particular individuals before it but is not conducive to the
resolution of broad issues of wide societal impact. A legislature,
on the other hand, is bound by none of these constraints. If
anyone must determine which of private interests directly in
conflict is to be protected for the greater benefit of society, it
is clear that a legislature is better suited to do so, and that such
resolution is entitled to due deference from courts.
2. Legitimacy '
Even an elected judiciary, and particularly the federal judi-
ciary which is appointed and whose members "hold their Off-
ices during good Behaviour"'59 is not a representative political
institution. As such, it is not and cannot be expected to be, as
closely in touch with the will of the people as are representative
legislatures. The Court in particular is relied upon for the pro-
nouncement of the fundamental principles by which society is
to be governed. It draws its strength from the text of the Consti-
tution.'60 To the extent that it is perceived as departing from
the clear mandate of that text, its strength is sapped. When the
Court is engaged in deciding whether constitutional values
which have come into direct conflict with other values are to
be protected, it is making a decision which is not mandated by
the Constitution. If the decision it makes is out of touch with
the values shared by society-at-large, the Court is in danger of
losing the respect of the people. It loses the strength that it
needs to perform the function perceived as primary, namely the
pronouncement of fundamental principles.
3. Flexibility''
The adjudicatory process, at least in common-law systems,
operates under the principle of stare decisis. A decision once
158. See generally A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 99-118 (1976).
159. U.S. CONsT. art. 1L1, § 1.
160. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 48.
161. See generally Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 CHI. L. REV. 501,
541-72 (1948).
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made is expected to be followed, even if it was a bad one. This
is singularly true of constitutional adjudication, where
"satellite concepts" '162 developed by the Court are treated as if
part of the Constitution itself. Bad decisions are overruled with
difficulty. It took a Civil War to overrule Scott v. Sanford."3 It
took the sixteenth amendment to overrule Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co."6 4 It took fifty-eight years for Plessy v.
Ferguson"5 to be overruled. Freezing a particular result of a
balancing of interests into the realm of constitutional adjudica-
tion would appear undesirable unless necessary.
A legislature on the other hand can repeal laws as freely as
it passes them. If a piece of legislation appears unwise a pro-
perly functioning political process can be relied upon to secure
its prompt repeal.'66 Moreover, particular laws enacted by a
legislature need not be doctrinally consistent. A legislature can
decide to favor one interest in one area and a conflicting inter-
est in another area without even being expected to provide a
doctrinal rationale. 6' Societal values are invariably in flux and
must be balanced with great sensitivity. This also is a task to
which a legislature is better suited than a court.
D. The Place of Constitutional Common Law"11
Necessarily the Court cannot be restricted to textual exe-
gesis of the Constitution. For one thing, as has been pointed
out, '6 all of the institutional considerations canvassed above
are outweighed by the need for a forum to judge the bona fides
of purported representative governmental assertions of general-
ized private interests. For another, the notion that in the face
of legislative silence it is entirely proper for courts to evolve a
body of decisional law in the course of adjudicating cases
brought before them has been part of our jurisprudence since
it first developed in twelfth century England. The course of
constitutional adjudication is no different.
Constitutional common law has been described as "a sub-
162. Id. at 506.
163. 60 U.S. (10 How.) 393 (1857).
164. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
165. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
166. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
167. See TRIBE, supra note 9, at 269.
168. See generally Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Monaghan].
169. See text accompanying notes 144-47 supra.
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structure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules draw-
ing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by,
various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional
common law subject to amendment, modification or even rev-
ersal by Congress." 7 ' Since it does not fit the paradigm of core
constitutional adjudication, and is essentially legislative in
character,' 71 it follows that such common law as developed by
the Court must bow to the express pronouncement of Congress.
It is even asserted that, at least in areas other than those of
exclusively national concern, 7 1 such common law is subject to
being overruled, directly or indirectly, by the states.7 3 The rea-
sons given for this general legislative superiority are similar to
those discussed above.' 7 4
It would seem, then, that the proper role for the Court in
the process of balancing private interests in direct conflict is a
common-law one.' 75 The results of such a balancing process
would draw "their inspiration and authority from, but (would)
not (be) required by" the Constitution. Moreover, they would
be "subject to . . . reversal" by the express pronouncements
of truly representative legislatures, both state and federal, re-
flecting the superior institutional competence of such bodies in
this area.
II. STATE ACTION AS ABSTENTIONISM
A. The Role of the Court Vis-a-Vis the Legislature
Against this background it can be readily seen that the state
action requirement is indeed an abstentionist doctrine, 76 in-
voked by the Court when asked to weigh private interests in
direct conflict in the face of a decision on that score by a truly
representative legislature. Such abstention, far from being an
abdication of judicial responsibility, reflects legitimate institu-
tional concerns and is motivated by a due deference to the
legislative function. As such, it is required by notions both of
the separation of powers and of federalism.
170. Monaghan, supra note 168, at 2-3.
171. Id. at 23.
172. Id. at 10-17.
173. Id. at 34-38.
174. Id. at 28-29.
175. See TwBE, supra note 9, at 296 & n.40.
176. The state action requirement was so described, somewhat perjoratively in
Thompson, supra note 11, at 22.
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When presented with the same type of question of the bal-
ance to be struck between private interests in direct conflict,
but in the face of legislative silence, the Court's role is changed
because there is nothing to which it must defer. Then the
Court's role becomes the ancient one of the creator of common
law.
If the Court is not faced by legislative silence but perceives
that the pronouncement came from a legislature which is not
truly representative, one in which due regard was not accorded
to all of the interests involved, the Court's role shifts again. It
is then that the Court dons the weighty mantle of Marbury v.
Madison' to effect the framers' intent for the functioning of
the political processes they engineered.
B. A Tentative Approach to State Action Analysis
The central determination the Court must make when pre-
sented with a case of private interests in direct conflict is, then,
whether those interests have already been balanced by a pro-
perly functioning political process. This threshold inquiry does
not undertake to balance those interests but rather seeks to
ascertain whether the balance which has already been struck
is truly representative. A method of analysis designed to arrive
at such a determination would ask the following questions:
1. Whose Interests Are Implicated?
It must obviously first be ascertained whether the case pres-
ents a situation where private interests are in direct conflict.
If the state is a party to the action, this does not assure that
the case is one of the second category. It must still be deter-
mined if the state is the "real party in interest." If the state is
not a party it must still be determined if the parties to the
action are truly asserting their own interests rather than gener-
alized interests in an attenuated representative capacity. Ex-
isting standing requirements may be helpful in making this
determination but are not conclusive. 78
177. 5 U.S. 368, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
178. This is because "surrogate" standing may be found even though constitutional
rights are asserted in a representative capacity. The decision to grant representational
standing is based, inter alia, upon a finding that the rights asserted will be adequately
advocated before the Court. On the other hand, a finding of no state action as here
understood requires, inter alia, that the personal interests of the parties before the
Court be in direct conflict. This involves an entirely different showing. For a general
discussion of representational standing and the factors considered in granting it, see
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Once this problem is solved the interests asserted must be
identified with a view toward solving the ultimate problem,
that of whether those interests have been fairly represented.
Interests do not participate in the political process, people do.
As such, the nexus between the interest asserted and the person
asserting it must be established. It may here be observed that
this problem reduces to the familiar one in legal analysis, that
of classifying legal relationships. The conflicting interests will
probably fall into one of the familiar relational patterns, such
as creditor-debtor, landlord-tenant, vendor-vendee and
tortfeasor-victim. The relational classification may have to be
further narrowed, however; for example, tortfeasor-victim may
have to be more precisely categorized as discriminator-victim
of racial discrimination.
2. Has the Legislature Spoken?
The next question must clearly be asked because if the
answer is no the Court must necessarily proceed to the merits.
This is true even if state decisional law has balanced the inter-
ests, because whatever reasons there are for deference to legis-
latures, those reasons do not require deference to courts. The
Younger v. Harris' doctrine would apply only to the timing of
the federal action. The adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine' 0 would be implicated if the constitutional
relief sought were denied for reasons such as waiver ' or laches,
but not if the state court decision proceeded to the merits nor
if the state grounds were found not to be fair and substantial. '
These doctrines have nothing to do with the state action re-
quirement, but rest on independent bases. The analysis here
presented squares quite well with Shelley v. Kraemer, '8 a deci-
sion which has generally troubled the commentators. '84 Accord-
ing to the instant approach the situation presented in Shelley
Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974). See
also TRIBE, supra note 9, at 100-14.
179. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 98-99 (1972) (White,
J., dissenting). See generally TRIBE, supra note 9, at 152-56.
180. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1935). See generally TRIBE,
supra note 9, at 120-29.
181. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102-03 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
182. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss., 286 U.S. 276, 282 (1932).
183. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
184. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1959).
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would require a finding of state action because it was a
common-law rule which was invoked to balance the interests
and no special deference is owed such interpretation by the
Court. Common law, far from being a shield for state action,'"
is especially susceptible to nullification on that ground.
For the legislature to be considered to have spoken it is not
required that it have addressed the particular issue in question.
It is enough for the legislature to have enacted a comprehensive
scheme covering the entire area from which it can be inferred
that all aspects of the area were intended to be covered. This
is, of course, a matter of degree, but it involves no more than
the familiar search for legislative intent. The question thus
reduces to one of whether the legislature intended to resolve the
particular issue in dispute. In this regard, the construction
placed upon the state legislation by the highest court of the
state is, of course, binding on the Supreme Court.'86
3. Are Those Interests Fairly Represented? .
The resolution of this question is at the heart of the inquiry.
Once the particular interest holders have been identified it is
an easy matter to ascertain whether they are full participants
in the political process. If discrete and insular minorities are
involved, that does not end the inquiry but shifts it to one of
determining whether the member of the minority is being ex-
cluded to any significant extent from full participation in the
political process. This explains both Moose Lodge v. Irvis sT and
Evans v. Abney.' 8 In Moose Lodge a black was excluded from
service in a private club.' 9 Without undertaking to balance his
interest in being served against the directly conflicting one of
the Moose lodge in excluding him, the Court could readily
determine that the affront did not limit his participation in an
aspect of social intercourse which influences the political pro-
cess. Similarly, in Abney the park was closed to both races so
that the aspect of social intercourse from which blacks were
185. See Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
186. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
187. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
188. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
189. It is noteworthy that even Professor Black, whose exhortations to the Court
on the subject of the elimination of racial discrimination cannot be paralled in elo-
quence, indicated that he would have come to the same result on these facts. See
Black, supra note 1, at 101.
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excluded was one from which whites were also excluded.
If the denial of rights secured by the first ten amendments
is implicated, the inquiry becomes whether the values of insur-
ing effective political participation served by those rights are
affected. This explains Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner 110 and
Hudgens v. NLRBI9' and in particular serves to explain the
following anomaly presented by the first amendment analysis
in those cases: Whereas the least restrictive means test is
usually applied to the denial of the right to .free speech in
instances where the private interests in conflict are attenuated,
in these cases that test was applied instead to the right to free
speech itself. Under the suggested analysis, the problem is re-
solved when it is borne in mind that the relevant inquiry is
whether the value of effective political participation served by
the right of free speech is threatened by the conflicting interest.
The Court seems to have found that the demonstrations could
effectively be held on the nearby public sidewalks and thus
concluded that the relevant value was not threatened.
The end point of the entire inquiry is a determination of
whether the conflicting interests were adequately reflected in
the legislative decision to strike the balance between them
where it did. If the answer to this question is yes, the analysis
proceeds no further. State action in the relevant sense-denial
by the state of the right asserted by the complaining party-is
missing. The right has not been denied; it has been balanced
out, in full accordance with the framers' intent, by the working
of the political processes which they established.
IV. AN APPLICATION TO SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION
We return full circle to the inquiry with which this com-
ment began, that of whether U.C.C. § 9-503 violates due pro-
cess of law. It will become clear, first of all, that there is no
relevant distinction between sections 9-503 and 7-210 so that,
depending on the outcome of this analysis, Flagg Bros. Inc. v.
Brooks'9 2 was either rightly or wrongly decided. It will also,
interestingly enough, become clear that there is no relevant
distinction between U.C.C. § 9-503 and statutory replevin'9 3 or
190. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
191. See generally TRIBE, supra note 9, at 682-88.
192. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
193. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 103 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). Or




sequestration so that, also depending upon the outcome of this
analysis, precedential effect is to be given to either Fuentes v.
Shevin 1 4 or Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co."9 5
1. Whose Interests are Implicated?
It is clear that, regardless of the party structure, the con-
flicting interests are on the one hand, those of the creditor in
retrieving the collateral upon.default, and on the other hand,
those of the debtor in maintaining possession of the collateral.
This is a paradigm case of private interests in direct conflict
and thus, broadly speaking, under this analysis, the sole in-
quiry becomes, whether the interests involved are fairly repre-
sented in the political process which chose to balance them as
it did.
Identification of the interests asserted and establishment of
the nexus between each one of them and the person asserting
it are simple matters. The conflicting interests fall into the
familiar relational pattern of secured creditor-debtor. If a con-
sumer is involved the classification can be further narrowed to
that of purchase money secured creditor-consumer debtor.
2. Has the Legislature Spoken?
Although the right to self-help repossession was originally
a matter of common law, a point which, far from compelling a
finding of no state action "6 would, if anything, militate toward
a finding of state action, the point is actually of no significance
whatsoever. 1 7 The enactment into statutory law is a legislative
judgment which requires deference from the Court. Since the
legislation in question clearly deals with the precise issue in
express words, "8 there is no doubt that the legislature has spo-
ken.
3. Are those Interests Fairly Represented?
The question now becomes whether the interest holders are
full participants in the political process which resulted in the
enactment of the U.C.C. into law. There is no reason to suppose
194. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
195. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
196. See Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
197. A point which did not escape Justice Rehnquist in Flagg. See 436 U.S. at 162
& n.13.
198. See note 11 supra.
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that the creditor class has been in any way excluded from full
participation in the political process. The inquiry thus focuses
upon the debtor class. The first query to be posed is whether
the debtor class can in any way be classified as a discrete and
insular minority.
Certainly the general class in debtors is in no way limited
to. poor debtors, but includes rich debtors as well. The particu-
lar debtor challenging the constitutionality of U.C.C. § 9-503
could as easily be an operator of an automobile dealership as a
ghetto-dwelling consumer. The inquiry becomes more focused,
however, if we assume that the debtor is an impecunious con-
sumer.
As has been alluded to earlier ' a number of recent cases
decided by the Court 20 whether rightly or wrongly, establish
that wealth is not treated as a suspect classification. This pre-
supposes that, for purposes of constitutional law, the poor do
not constitute a discrete and insular minority, cut off from full
participation in the political process. In this instance, such a
conclusion might be reinforced by noting that in one state °20 the
right to self-help repossession does not exist and in Wisconsin2 11
it does not exist with respect to collateral held by a consumer
debtor. In those instances it does appear that the political pro-
cess was receptive to the interest of the consumer class in the
abolition of self-help repossession. Furthermore, U.C.C. § 9-
503 itself contains a breach of the peace limitation, reflecting
the fact that some interests of consumers were taken into con-
sideration.20 3
It next remains to be determined whether any rights se-
cured by the first ten amendments are implicated. The debtor's
right to be free from a denial of property without due process
of law is involved, but the same can be said for the creditor.0 4
199. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
200. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). This is precisely the point that can be understood as
troubling Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Flagg. See 436 U.S. at 166-67
(1978).
201. Louisiana. See note 9 supra.
202. Wis. STAT. § 425.206 (1977).
203. See White, supra note 7, at 525-26.
204. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). See also
Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2
HAST. CONST. L.Q. 893, 930 & n.97 (1975).
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More on point is the inquiry as to whether the denial to the
debtor of that right will preclude him from full participation
in all aspects of social intercourse which influence the outcome
of the political process. If the collateral is an automobile it may
well have that effect although the debtor is still not precluded
from using public transportation. If it is a television0 5 it will
certainly cut down on the level of speech to which he is ex-
posed. But the determinative factor is that the recognition of
the creditor's right to self-help repossession will not affect the
debtor to any significantly greater extent than he would be
affected were the television repossessed after a full hearing on
the merits. He may lose the use of the television for a month
or so,2"6 but it is difficult to contend that a month's worth of
television would make the debtor any more capable of intelli-
gent self-governance.
It is clear that most of these objections are spurious. They
have been discussed in order to demonstrate that the analysis
produces the same result no matter how hard one attempts to
press it to the point of absurdity: U.C.C. § 9-503 is clearly
constitutional because of the absence of state action in the
relevant sense.
V. CONCLUSION
It should be obvious that conspicuously absent from the
analytical method outlined above was any attempt to deal with
the substantive merits of the question of whether self-help re-
possession denies the debtor whose collateral is repossessed
property without due process of law. Since the debtor's inter-
ests are not the only ones involved, but rather come into direct
conflict with the legitimate interests of the creditor, any deci-
sion on the merits would be forced to balance these interests
rather than simply make a pronouncement as to the meaning
of a constitutional provision. The essence of the point which
this comment has attempted to make is that if those interests
have already been balanced by the outcome of an optimally
205. The breach of the peace limitation should assure, in any event, that a con-
sumer's private television will not be the subject of self-help repossession. That limita-
tion has the practical effect of limiting that remedy virtually exclusively to automo-
biles. See White, supra note 7, at 513. Thus, no debtor need fear that his television
will be repossessed by self-help, right in the middle of watching his favorite television
program.
206. For estimates of the amount of time involved, id. at 518.
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functioning political process, then, from the Court's point of
view, that is the end of the matter. In instances involving only
direct conflict between two private interests, the sole function
of the Court is to ascertain whether the political process is
indeed functioning as intended. This requires nothing more
than finding: (1) That the balancing was the outcome of a
political process in which all of the interests involved were fully
and fairly represented; and (2) That the result produced will
enable those interests to continue to be fully and fairly repre-
sented.
If this second point has not been adequately emphasized
heretofore, now is the time to press it since it follows from the
fact that an optimally functioning political process can pro-
duce bad results as easily as it can produce good ones. The
"machine" is not a computer, but is rather a system of human
institutions with all the error, uncertainty and tentativeness
that implies. As long as "those political processes. . . can...
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,"0 7
such repeal must be left to their operation. This requires no
more than a determination that none of the interests involved
has been in any way impaired from further pressing its point
in the political arena.
As long as this is the case the defeated interests can take
heart from the fact that change is inevitable. As Heraclitus
observed, no one swims in the same river twice, whereupon one
of his more perceptive disciples added, or even once.
Apparently, then, the message the Court is conveying in
Flagg is that if one objects to a creditors' remedy the course to
pursue lies in the utilization of the political process. The ex-
treme deference accorded to the legislative function makes it
unlikely that an appeal to the judicary would be successful.
YERACHMIEL E. WEINSTEIN
207. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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